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Abstract- The number of probability distributions required to populate a 
conditional probability table (CPT) in a Bayesian network, grows exponentially 
with the number of parent-nodes associated with that table. If the table is to be 
populated through knowledge elicited from a domain expert then the sheer 
magnitude of the task forms a considerable cognitive barrier. In this paper we 
devise an algorithm to populate the CPT while easing the extent of knowledge 
acquisition. The input to the algorithm consists of a set of weights that quantify 
the relative strengths of the influences of the parent-nodes on the child-node, and 
a set of probability distributions the number of which grows only linearly with the 
number of associated parent-nodes. These are elicited from the domain expert. 
The set of probabilities are obtained by taking into consideration the heuristics 
that experts use while arriving at probabilistic estimations. The algorithm is used 
to populate the CPT by computing appropriate weighted sums of the elicited 
distributions. We invoke the methods of information geometry to demonstrate 
how these weighted sums capture the expert's judgemental strategy. 
 
 
Key terms: Bayesian Network, differential geometry, heuristics in judgement, 
information geometry. 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Consider an example where we wish to assess the ‘efficiency’ of a small business 
company. Considering the uncertainties involved in such an endeavour, one approach 
would be to adopt the methods of probabilistic reasoning where we think of 
‘efficiency’ modelled as a random variable E, and assign the following five mutually 
exclusive states to it – very-low (vl), low (l), average (a), high (h), and very-high (vh). 
Our assessment would then be in terms of a probability distribution over these states. 
Now, reasoning about the efficiency in its most general terms would be intractable. 
An astute analyst would first identify a context or a set of factors that is directly 
relevant to the kind of assessment desired. Let us say that we can have a reasonable 
assessment if we consider ‘efficiency’ as directly dependent upon three factors, these 
being the levels of – ‘personnel morale’, ‘personnel training’, and ‘managerial 
expertise’ - in the company. These three factors affecting ‘efficiency’ can be modelled 
as random variables PM, PT, and ME respectively, each having the above mentioned 
five states. An assessment of these three factors will in turn provide an assessment of 
‘efficiency’. A rigorous way to do this is through a Bayesian network [1], [2] as 
shown in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. A Bayesian network to assess the ‘efficiency’ of a small business 
company. The child-node E representing ‘efficiency’ is influenced by three 
parent nodes representing - ‘personnel morale’ (PM), ‘personnel training’ 
(PT), and ‘managerial expertise’ (ME) - in the company. Each node has 5 
states: very-low (vl), low (l), average (a), high (h), and very-high (vh). 
 
This is a simple Bayesian network with one child-node being influenced by three 
parent-nodes. In general useful Bayesian networks boast of many more nodes with 
multiple levels of parent-child dependencies. For example, to assess the state of PT 
one may need to assess a set of other indicators which decide the level of ‘personnel 
training’. These would then form a set of parent-nodes for the node PT and so on. It is 
not our aim here to build a realistic network to assess ‘efficiency’. The network in 
Fig. 1 only serves to illustrate our analysis.  
 
Given our simple example, one assesses the levels of ‘personnel morale’, ‘personnel 
training’, and ‘managerial expertise’ as probability distributions over the respective 
random variables. The network accepts these three distributions as input and provides 
an assessment of ‘efficiency’ in terms of a probability distribution over E. For the 
network to provide such an output the nature of dependency of the child on its parents 
needs to be quantified. We do this by attaching a conditional probability table (CPT) 
to the bunch of arrows linking the child to its parents.  
 
Let us denote by Π a typical parental configuration for the network in Fig. 1. More 
precisely Π is a set consisting of 3 elements, each element representing a state of a 
different parent such as {PM = a, PT = l, ME = l}. The CPT consists of a collection of 
probability distributions over the child-node, one for each different parental 
configuration. These distributions, quantify the parent-child dependency, and have the 
form:  
{p(E = vl | Π ), p(E = l | Π ), p(E = a | Π ), p(E = h | Π ), p(E = vh | Π )} 
Here p(A) denotes the probability of an event A and p(A|Π) denotes the conditional 
probability p(A| PM = a, PT = l, ME = l) when Π refers to the parental configuration 
{PM = a, PT = l, ME = l}.  
 
As there are 53 different parental configurations Π, the CPT will comprise of 53 
probability distributions. This large number of distributions demands a considerable 
amount of intensive effort on the part of an analyst who wishes to generate the CPT. 
The vexing part is that it is not just large but exponentially large. A CPT quantifying 
the dependency on n parents would demand 5n distributions in order to be functional. 
It is this exponential growth with the number of parents that constitutes the essential 
problem. 
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If we could have a sufficiently adequate database, recording past trends of company 
efficiency and how it relied on various factors like training and morale etc., then a 
possible solution would be to automate the process of CPT generation by learning the 
conditional probabilities from the database - a process also referred to as batch 
learning [3]. However, as Jensen remarks [2, p. 81], “although the statistical theory 
(for learning) is well understood, no method has so far become the standard". Then 
again, for many practical problems one rarely finds a relevant database, even an 
inadequate one at that. In such cases the only available source of probabilistic 
information are the domain experts.  
 
To elicit required knowledge from the domain expert we have to ask questions of the 
following type: 
Given the scenario depicted in Fig. 1 and a parental configuration Π, what should be 
the probability distribution over the states of E?  
 
We need to ask the question 53 times, once for each different parental configuration 
Π. We would, say, start with the parental configuration where all the parents are in the 
state vl, figure out the distribution over E for this parental configuration, and then 
repeat this process systematically through all possible parental configurations until we 
have worked out the distribution over E for the configuration where all the parents are 
in the state vh. In this process the distributions that were worked out consecutively 
would mostly be consistent with each other. But it is well nigh impossible to ensure 
that distributions that occurred further apart would be mutually consistent. This is 
essentially because the expert is not a machine and therefore lacks a machine's 
uncompromising regularity. Just boredom and fatigue during an extended process will 
ensure that the criteria employed to figure out the distributions are not applied 
uniformly each time. One way out would be to systematise the method of eliciting 
probabilistic information from the expert. A number of techniques have been 
suggested to elicit such information in a reasonable amount of time [4], [5]. However 
these do not ease the problem of magnitude, the problem of the exponentially large 
number of probabilities that is required. Domain experts we encounter in model 
building operate under time constraints and are rarely keen to work through a large 
list of distributions no matter how little time and effort each distribution requires. As 
Druzdzel and van der Gaag remark in a fine review [6]: “We feel, therefore, that 
research efforts aimed at reducing the number of probabilities to be ∫ of more 
practical significance.”  
 
Some well known methods which reduce the number of probabilities that need to be 
elicited, are the Noisy-OR model proposed by Pearl [1] and its generalisations by 
other workers [7]-[9]. These models can compute the distributions needed for the CPT 
from a set of distributions, elicited from the expert, the magnitude of which grows 
linearly with the number of parents. However all these models are constrained by the 
assumption that parents act independently without synergy [7], [8]. This means that 
parents individually influence the child and that there are negligible cross – 
interactions between individual parent-to-child influences [1, pp 184-187]. Recently 
Lemmer and Gossink [10], have advanced the Noisy-OR technique to deal with 
networks that are not constrained by the above independence requirement. However 
they constrain their networks to have nodes with binary states only. 
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For Bayesian networks we are interested in, parents seldom act independently and the 
nodes often possess more than two states. This paper presents a formalism to tackle 
such networks. In Section II, we analyse some difficulties associated with knowledge 
elicitation from a domain expert. This leads us to the concept of compatible parental 
configurations which we exploit to formulate an algorithm to generate the CPT. The 
algorithm takes as input (a) a set of weights that quantify the relative strengths of the 
influences of the parents on the child node and (b) a set of probability distributions 
over the child node for compatible parental configurations. Thankfully, the latter set 
grows linearly rather than exponentially with the number of parents. It is difficult to 
validate the algorithm by comparing its results with similar results obtained from 
other sources, because such other sources very rarely exist. In Section III we argue 
that the algorithm would be justified if we can show that the logic behind the 
algorithm mirrors the judgemental strategy of the domain experts. We employ 
methods of information geometry to do just this. Finally Section IV concludes the 
paper. 
 
Software implementing the algorithm currently exists and has been used extensively 
to construct Bayesian networks for defence related problems [11]-[13]. 
 
 
 
II. EASING THE KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION PROBLEM 
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Fig. 2. A Bayesian network with one child-node X with states {  
being influenced by n parent-nodes Y . Any such parent-node Y
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Let us fix a general network as shown in Fig. 2 to conduct our analysis. The network 
consists of one child node being influenced by  parent nodes. The parent nodes 
represent n random variables Y  and any such variable Y
1≥n
nY,,1 L i has states 
 with . The child node represents a random variable X with m+1 
states {  with .  
ik
},,{ 1 ikii yy L
, 10 xx
2≥ik
}m,, xL 1≥m
 
A typical parental configuration of the network, is a set consisting of n elements, and 
will take the form:  
};,,{ 111 n
s
nn
s yYyY == L where nn ksks ≤≤≤≤ 1 ,,11 L1 .     (1) 
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The network will have k  such parental configurations requiring a CPT with 
as many probability distributions over the child node X. For the parental configuration 
(1) such a distribution has the form:  
nk××L1
( ) ( ) ( ){ }nnn snsmsnssns yyxpyyxpyyxp ,,| , ,,,| ,,,| 111 11110 LLLL                                         (2) 
Here ( )nsnsi yyxp ,,| 11 L  is short for the conditional probability ( )nsnyxXp = nsi YyY == ,,| 111 L ; if Π denotes the parental configuration (1) then we 
may also write this conditional probability as ( )Π|ixp .  
 
To elicit the distributions of the type (2) we have to ask the domain expert questions 
of the following type: 
QA: Given a parental configuration {  what should be the 
probability distribution over the states of the child X?  
},,111 n
s
nn
s yYyY == L
This question has to be asked nkk ××L1  times to account for all possible parental 
configurations. As we have already said, when n is large, experts baulk at such an 
extensive cognitive load. What is more, this is not all that is problematic here. A 
closer look reveals fundamental difficulties that afflict some of the questions of the 
type QA. Let us elucidate.  
 
 
A. Heuristics in Probability Assessment 
 
A domain expert’s knowledge is gained through personal experience. This knowledge 
would be as rich as his experiences are and as coloured as his prejudices. The 
probabilities we extract by questioning such an expert are subjective probabilities [3], 
[14], [15]. For our purposes it is sufficient to accept that this notion of probability is 
personalistic, it reflects the degree of belief of a particular person at a particular time. 
However to continue with our deliberations, it is imperative that, we have some 
understanding as to how people arrive at probabilistic estimations. According to 
widely accepted research people rarely follow the principles of probability when 
reasoning about uncertain events, rather they replace the laws of probability by a 
limited number of heuristics [16], [17]. In a classic paper, Kahneman and Tversky 
describe three frequently used heuristics, (i) representativeness, (ii) availability, and 
(iii) adjustment from an anchor [18]. Although these heuristics can lead to systematic 
errors, they are highly economical and usually very effective in making probabilistic 
judgements. 
 
Let us discuss the availability and the related simulation heuristics, which are relevant 
at this point [19]-[21]. Kahneman and Tversky reason as follows. Life-long 
experience has taught us that frequent events are easier to recall than infrequent ones. 
The availability heuristics exploits the inverse form of this empirical observation. The 
more cognitively accessible an event is, the more likely it is perceived to occur. In 
other words one relates the likelihood of an event to the ease with which this event is 
recalled or pictured in one’s mind. A person is said to employ the availability 
heuristic whenever he or she estimates the probability of an event by estimating the 
ease with which the occurrence of the event could be brought to mind. Often one 
encounters situations where instances of the occurrence of one or other outcome are 
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not stored in the memory ready for recall. Probabilistic judgements for such outcomes 
are arrived at through a mental operation that resembles the running of a simulation 
model. One constructs a mental model of the situation and runs a mental simulation to 
assess the ease with which the simulation could produce different outcomes, given a 
set of initial conditions and operating parameters. The ease with which the mental 
simulation reaches a particular outcome is taken as a measure of the propensity of the 
real system to produce that outcome and hence an assessment of the probability for 
that outcome, given the initial conditions. This is the simulation heuristic. 
 
Let us apply the above heuristics to our adopted example in Fig. 1. Given that 
scenario a typical expert would have conceptualised a general set of dependency 
criteria, albeit subjective, relating personnel wellbeing and competency to 
organisational efficiency. When asked the question - given the scenario depicted in 
Fig. 1, and a parental configuration Π what should be the probability distribution 
over the states of E? - the expert may recall instances of companies having parental 
configurations as in Π, and how they fared. However, more often than not the expert 
would carry out a mental simulation. He would start with the initial conditions given 
by Π, then using his expert knowledge imagine various paths of evolution of the 
fortunes of the company. The relative ease with which the simulation produces 
various states of efficiency can be estimated in a 0 to 1 scale. This in turn would 
provide the probability distribution over the states of 'efficiency'.  
 
In the more general context questions of the type QA would be answered in a similar 
manner. However since QA fixes the states of all the parents how would the expert 
answer the question when the parental states are not consistent with each other? For a 
better understanding of this point consider the network in Fig. 1 again. Let us fix the 
parental states as follows: ‘personnel morale’, is very-high ‘personnel training’ is 
very-low, and ‘managerial expertise’ is very-low. What, we ask the expert, should be 
the probability distribution over 'efficiency' in this context. Now, one would be hard 
put to name companies where personnel have very low level of training and managers 
are highly incompetent but morale is very high nonetheless. Given such a context, the 
expert will have great difficulty in running mental simulations to imagine the various 
possible paths of evolution of the fortunes of the company. The specified initial state 
significantly diverges from normally held belief. According to Kahneman and 
Tversky this calls for change in one’s current mental model before the run of the 
simulation. The expert’s mental model, of the workings of business concerns, would 
have to be revised first, to make the given context “as unsurprising as possible, and 
the simulation would employ the parameters of the revised model” [21]. Invariably 
experts would fail to make such drastic changes to their belief system with 
equanimity; the simulations they would run would only give rise to more and more 
confusion and little clarification. To obviate such difficulties we proscribe asking 
questions of the type QA, which involve incompatible parental states. In fact we adopt 
a very different strategy, one that directly expunges such eventualities.  
 
 
B. Compatible Parental Configurations 
 
To restate our problem, some parental configurations would seem incompatible to the 
expert when his mental model does not support them. How would the expert deal with 
such parental configurations? Interestingly, such situations do not arise for those 
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networks that conform to the Noisy-OR model because of the independency 
assumption used therein. It is therefore instructive to look at an example, and Pearl 
gives a good one. He considers a scenario where a burglar alarm can be triggered 
either by an attempted burglary or by an earthquake [1, pp 184-187]. This scenario 
can be modelled as a Bayesian network where the burglar alarm is the child-node, and 
this is being influenced causally by two parent-nodes representing burglary and 
earthquake. As Pearl correctly argues, reasoning about burglaries and reasoning about 
earthquakes belong to disparate frames of knowledge - frames of knowledge that are 
truly foreign to one another. Hence the individual parental influences, in this case, are 
necessarily independent of each other - a fact that makes the Noisy-OR and its 
generalised versions work. The same premises would also ensure that parental 
configurations never appear to be incompatible to an expert, as he would be reasoning 
about individual parents in disparate frames of knowledge. This is not true for the 
networks we have under present consideration. In other words for networks that 
interests us, there necessarily exists a coherent frame of knowledge which confines 
within itself reasoning about each and every parent and their influences on the child. 
Given our example in Fig. 1, say, a typical expert would have studied the rise and fall 
of various companies. He would have noted how their fortunes were decided by the 
capabilities of their personnel and how these capabilities naturally interact with each 
other. In other words any competent expert would duly acquire a frame of knowledge 
within which his reasoning about the parents and their influences can be conducted 
with little difficulty. This motivates our two assumptions below. 
 
Definition: Consider the network in Fig. 2, and suppose that the parent Yi is in the 
state . We say that the state Y , for the parent Yisiy
is
iy
js
jj y= j, is compatible with the state 
, if according to the expert’s mental model the state Y  is most likely to 
coexist with the state Y . Let {Comp(Y )} denote the compatible parental 
configuration where Y
iY = jsjj y=
is
ii y=
is
iy
is
ii y=
i is in the state  and the rest of the parents are in states 
compatible with Y .  
is
iy
i =
 
We now make our first assumption: 
Assumption A: Given the network in Fig. 2, the expert can acquire a coherent frame of 
knowledge within which it is possible to decide upon a compatible parental 
configuration {Comp(Y )} for any parent Yisii y= i and any state  of this parent. isiy
Clearly different experts will conceptualise {Comp(Y )} in different ways. 
Instead of asking questions of the type QA, we now ask questions of the following 
type: 
is
ii y=
QB: Given the parental configuration {Comp(Y )} what should be the 
probability distribution over the states of the child X? 
is
ii y=
In other words we seek distributions of the type: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ })}({| , ,)}({| ,)}({| 10 iii siimsiisii yYCompxpyYCompxpyYCompxp === L   
where 1≤ i ≤ n and .                                                                                     (3) ii ks ≤≤1 
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Remark: Let us stress that {Comp(Y )} is a parental configuration in the mental 
model of the expert where he has chosen to focus on the state  of the parent Y
is
ii y=
is
iy i 
while the rest of the parents are perceived in his judgement to be in states compatible 
with this state of Yi. We are not asserting that parental configurations are only to be 
found as compatible parental configurations in reality. Nor are we asserting that 
questions of the type QA with manifestly incompatible parental configuration are 
meaningless questions. The concern is rather with the fact that when the expert 
believes a certain parental configuration to be incompatible, QA would lead to 
confusion. Why would a divergence like this exist between the expert's reasoning and 
the reasoning required to populate the CPT? The explanation is quite simple. The 
expert's reasoning is guided not only by the nature of the network but also by the 
ambient knowledge that impinges on the network. The CPT, on the other hand, is 
separated from the ambient knowledge by the requirements of d-separation [1], [2], 
which Bayesian networks must satisfy. Our mode of knowledge elicitation must 
conform to the expert's way of thinking, as he is our primary source of knowledge. 
We ensure this by asking questions of the type QB, which involve, only compatible 
parental configurations as perceived by the expert. How to be in conformity with the 
expert and still be able to generate the CPT is what we are going to discuss next. 
 
Our Bayesian network will have nkk ++L1  compatible parental configurations of the 
type {Comp(Y )} requiring us to ask the question QB that many times to obtain 
all possible distributions of the type (3). Note that the number of distributions of the 
type (3) grows linearly rather than exponentially with n. For example, with the 
network shown in Fig. 1 there are 5×3 distributions of the type (3) as against 5
is
ii y=
3 
distributions of the type (2). 
 
If the states of the parents have a one-to-one compatibility correspondence, which is 
also an equivalence relation, then the number of questions of the type QB can be 
reduced drastically. Let us explain. Consider the case where the parents have the same 
number of states i.e., kkkk n ==== L21 , and suppose that: 
st
yYyY
njikt
yYyY
s
jj
t
ii
t
jj
t
ii
≠
==
≤≤
==
whenever 
   withcompatiblenot  is 
but },,,1{ in  and any for  and 1for 
   withcompatible is 
L                                                            (4) 
 
Then using the symbol '≡' to relate two identical sets, we have 
{Comp(Y )} ≡ {Comp(Y )} ≡ ∫ ≡{Comp(Y )}  ty11 = ty22 = tnn y=
≡ {Y , Y , ∫, Y } for 1≤ t ≤ k. ty11 = ty22 = tnn y=
Hence there are only k different compatible parental configurations corresponding to 
the k states of any parent. In other words we have to ask the question QB k times only, 
or the number of questions, in this case, are fixed and do not grow with the number of 
parents. One should therefore endeavour to formulate the problem such that the 
compatibility correspondences as in (4) are achieved. It may not always be possible to 
achieve one-to-one correspondence among all the parents. Nonetheless, making it 
happen among a subset of parents will help reduce the number of questions to be 
asked. We illustrate this with an example below. 
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1) Example: Consider the network depicted in Fig. 1. To assign the 5×3 probability 
distributions, of the type (3), over the child node E, for compatible parental 
configurations, let us say the expert adopts the following way of thinking. He starts 
with the parent PM, for which he subjectively interprets the compatible parental 
configurations as follows: 
{Comp(PM = s)} ≡ {PM = s, PT = s, ME = s}, for    s = vl, l, a, h, vh. 
If one treats compatibility as an equivalence relation then, to be consistent, the 
subjective interpretation for the compatible parental configurations related to other 
parents should be similar i.e., 
{Comp(PM = s)} ≡ {Comp(PT = s)} ≡ {Comp(ME = s)} 
 ≡ {PM = s, PT = s, ME = s},   for s = vl, l, a, h, vh                                                    (5) 
Hence for the probability distribution over the child node E one will have: 
p(E = e | {Comp(PM = s)})  
= p(E = e | {Comp(PT = s)})  
= p(E = e | {Comp(ME = s)})   for e, s = vl, l, a, h, vh                                                (6) 
In other words if the expert provides the 5 probability distributions over the node E 
corresponding to the 5 parental configurations {Comp(PM = s)}, s = vl, l, a, h, vh, 
then all the 5×3 distributions for compatible parental configurations are obtained. 
 
Achieving an agreeable state of affairs as the one just discussed would not always be 
possible. There are many factors which can deny the required one-to-one 
correspondence. An obvious example is one where parents have a different number of 
states. To see what can go wrong, consider Fig. 1 again, now with the proviso that the 
node PT has only three states {l, a, h}. For such a situation an expert may assign 
compatibility as follows: 
{Comp(PM = vl)} ≡ {Comp(ME = vl)} ≡ {PM = vl, PT = l, ME = vl};  
{Comp(PM = l)} ≡ {Comp(ME = l)} ≡ {PM = l, PT = l, ME = l}; 
{Comp(PM = a)} ≡ {Comp(ME = a)} ≡ {PM = a, PT = a, ME = a}; 
{Comp(PM = h)} ≡ {Comp(ME = h)} ≡ {PM = h, PT = h, ME = h}; 
{Comp(PM = vh)} ≡ {Comp(ME = vh)} ≡ {PM = vh, PT = h, ME = vh}. 
The state PT = l occurs in both the first two parental configurations above, thus we 
have lost the one-to-one correspondence. If, for the sake of argument, the expert 
perceives  
{Comp(PT = l)} ≡ {PM = vl, PT = l, ME = l},  
then we have to add this to the 5 parental configurations listed above and a similar 
addition may be required for the state PT = h. Thus we would require more than 5 
probability distributions over the node E. Possibly 7, but still less than 15 because we 
have a one-to-one correspondence between the states of PM and ME. 
 
 
C. The Relative Weights 
 
The CPT nevertheless requires probability distributions for all possible parental 
configurations compatible or not. Is there a way to generate the rest of the 
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distributions from the compatible ones? This leads us to the concept of relative 
weights.  
 
If the expert can acquire a coherent frame of knowledge, within which he can reason 
about all the parental influences, then this ability in turn would give the ability to 
compare these influences - i.e. an ability to figure out which parents are more 
influential and which are less so. Experience in populating CPTs [11]-[13], shows that 
experts happily exploit this ability when they can. They find it instinctive to assign 
relative weights to the parents to quantify the relative strengths of their influences on 
the child node. Weights, it seems, assist the process of mental simulations as 
discussed before. We therefore make our second assumption. 
 
Assumption B: Given the network in Fig. 2, the expert can acquire a coherent frame of 
knowledge to reason about the parental influences such that it is possible to assign 
relative weights , to the parents Y  respectively, to quantify the 
relative strengths of their influences on the child node X. Of course the weights have 
to be positive and for later convenience we stipulate that they be assigned in a 
normalised form i.e., 0
nww ,,1 L
wi
nY,,1 L
ni ,,1for  ,1 L=≤≤ , and 11 =++ nwLw . 
 
 
D. The weighted sum algorithm 
 
If all the information that the expert is willing to give us are:  
ions,configurat parental compatiblefor  (3),  type theof      
,over  onsdistributiy probabilit    the(b)
and ,,  weightsrelative   the(a)
1
1
Xkk
ww
n
n++L
L
                                        (7) 
then can we generate the CPT for the network in Fig. 2? The answer is 'yes' and we 
put forward the following algorithm. 
 
The relative weights naturally suggest a weighted sum procedure. Given the 
information contained in (7), we propose the following weighted sum algorithm to 
estimate the nkk ××L1  distributions of the type (2).  
( ) ( )
.,,2,1 and ,,1,0 here
)}({|,,,|
1
21
21
jj
n
j
s
jj
l
j
s
n
ssl
ksml
yYCompxpwyyyxp jn
LL
L
==
==∑
=                                                (8) 
 
1) Example: Before we examine the validity of the weighted sum algorithm let us 
check if it is intuitively satisfying as per the network in Fig. 1. To start with, the 
expert assigns the parent nodes PM, PT, and ME with the relative weights 
 respectively. Next he specifies the 5×3 probability distributions, of the 
type (3), over the child node E for compatible parental configurations. If he adopts the 
way of thinking described in Section II-B-1 then all he needs to do is provide the 5 
probability distributions over the node E corresponding to the 5 parental 
configurations {Comp(PM = s)}, s = vl, l, a, h, vh. Let us say the expert estimates 
these distributions as given in Table 1. The essence of this estimation is that the 
parental configuration {Comp(PM = s)} gives rise to a unimodal probability 
distribution over E with the mode at E = s. 
321  and , www
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TABLE 1 
Distribution over E for compatible parental configurations {Comp(PM = s)} 
Probability distribution over 
E s = vl s = l s = a s = h s = vh 
p(E = vl | {Comp(PM = s)}) 0.8 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.005 
p(E = l | {Comp(PM = s)}) 0.15 0.8 0.08 0.03 0.015 
p(E = a | {Comp(PM = s)}) 0.03 0.08 0.8 0.08 0.03 
p(E = h | {Comp(PM = s)}) 0.015 0.03 0.08 0.8 0.15 
p(E = vh | {Comp(PM = s)}) 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.8 
 
From the 5 distributions in Table 1 all the 5×3 distributions of the type (3) can be 
obtained using relations (6). Taking these distributions and the weights as input, the 
weighted sum algorithm (8) would be able to calculate all the 53 distributions required 
to populate the CPT. Let us consider two instances of this calculation to see if the 
algorithm calculates intuitively satisfying distributions. 
 
Compatible Parental Configuration: Consider first the simple case where we want to 
find the distribution over E when PM, PT, and ME are all in the state vh i.e.: 
{p(E = e | PM = vh, PT = vh, ME = vh), e = vl, l, a, h, vh }                                        (9) 
According to (8) we need to carry out the following computations 
p(E = e | PM = vh, PT = vh, ME = vh)  
= p(E = e | {Comp(PM = vh)}) + w p(E = e | {Comp(PT = vh)})                        (10) 1w 2
   + p(E = e | {Comp(ME = vh)}), e = vl, l, a, h, vh. 3w
Taking the relation (6) and the fact that 1321 =++ www  into account, (10) gives: 
p(E = e | PM = vh, PT = vh, ME = vh)  
= p(E = e | {Comp(PM = vh)}), e = vl, l, a, h, vh. 
But this is what we expected because of the way of thinking adopted by the expert 
regarding compatible parental states as recorded in relation (5). More explicitly the 
distribution (9) corresponds to the last column of Table 1. 
 
Incompatible Parental Configuration: Let us next consider the parental configuration 
where ‘personnel morale’ is in the state very-high while ‘personnel training’, and 
‘managerial expertise’ are each in the state very-low. We seek the distribution 
p(E = e | PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl), e = vl, l, a, h, vh                                (11) 
According to (8) we need to carry out the following computations 
p(E = e | PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl)  
= p(E = e | {Comp(PM = vh)}) + w p(E = e | {Comp(PT = vl)})                        (12) 1w 2
+ p(E = e | {Comp(ME = vl)}), e = vl, l, a, h, vh. 3w
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We have discussed this parental configuration in Section II-A where we remarked that 
it promotes confusion in probabilistic assessments, as the configuration diverges from 
the expert's normally held belief. This normally held belief is reflected in the 
compatible parental configurations set down in (5), according to which PM = vh is 
incompatible with PT = vl and ME = vl. The expert's belief is also reflected in the 
unimodal nature of the distributions in Table 1, which says that {Comp(PM = vh)} has 
an influence on E which contradicts the influences of the parental configurations 
{Comp(PT = vl)} and {Comp(ME = vl)}. Suppose the expert assigns the weights as - 
. In other words he considers PM to be as influential as 
PT and ME combined. This further sharpens the contradiction. What would be the 
probability distribution (11) as computed by the algorithm. This is easily found by 
substituting the weights and the respective distributions from Table 1 into (12). 
Column 2 of Table 2 displays this distribution. Note that the distribution is bimodal 
with modes at E = vl and at E = vh portraying a confusing state of affairs as would be 
expected. Let us try another set of weights such as 
25.0 .25,0 ,5.0 321 === www
45.0 .45,0 ,1.0 321 === www . 
This suggests that the influence of PM on E is small compared to the combined 
influences of PT and ME. This weakens the contradiction as we can now overlook the 
influence of PM on E. The corresponding distribution in column 3 of Table 2 reflects 
this less confusing state of affairs.  
 
TABLE 2 
Distribution over E for the parental configuration {PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl} 
 25.0
 .25,0 ,5.0
3
21 =
==
w
ww
45.0
 .45,0 ,1.0
3
21 =
==
w
ww
p(E = vl | PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl) 0.4025 0.7205 
p(E = l | PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl) 0.0825 0.1365 
p(E = a | PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl) 0.03 0.03 
p(E = h | PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl) 0.0825 0.0285 
p(E = vh | PM = vh, PT = vl, ME = vl) 0.4025 0.0845 
 
Apart from being intuitively satisfying the weighted sum should give us a valid 
algorithm. This question of validity is rather a tricky one. We are not trying to 
validate the CPT produced by the weighted sum algorithm against a CPT that can be 
produced through other means e.g., one that can be produced through batch learning. 
This is for the obvious reason that such other means of producing a CPT seldom exist, 
due to the reasons already discussed. Rather the right question to ask is this.  
Suppose all the information that the expert is willing to give us are those 
contained in (7). Then, does the weighted sum procedure (8) provide an 
algorithm that is commensurate with the expert's subjective judgement? 
In the next section we will show that the answer to this question is in the affirmative.  
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III. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WEIGHTED SUM ALGORITHM 
 
A. Heuristics Governing the Algorithm 
 
Our algorithm takes in the information contained in (7) as input and generates the 
CPT. Suppose we ask the expert to do the same. In other words after eliciting the 
information contained (7) we ask the expert to build upon this information and 
generate the CPT on his own. How would he set about this task? Our motive in asking 
this rather rhetorical question is the following. If we can show, in a mathematically 
valid way, that our algorithm mirrors the judgemental strategy adopted by the expert 
in accomplishing the above task, then we will consider our algorithm to have been 
justified. 
 
To understand how the expert would proceed starting from (7), let us consider an 
example. To make it simple, let us say that our network in Fig. 2 has only two 
parent-nodes representing random variables Y  and Y . We ask the expert for the 
relative weights  and the set of 
1
2k
2
21  and ww 1k +  probability distributions over X for 
compatible parental configurations as in (13) and (14) below: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ })}({| , ,)}({| ,)}({| 111 11111110 smss yYCompxpyYCompxpyYCompxp === L  
 1 11 ks ≤≤ ,                                                                                                                 (13) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ })}({| , ,)}({| ,)}({| 222 22221220 smss yYCompxpyYCompxpyYCompxp === L    
221 ks ≤≤ .                                                                                                                 (14) 
With this information as a set of building blocks the expert now proceeds to estimate 
all probability distributions of the type  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }212121 21211210 ,| , ,,| ,,| ssmssss yyxpyyxpyyxp L   
                                                                                1 2211 1 and ksks ≤≤≤≤ .          (15) 
Recall that {Comp(Y )} is a parental configuration in the mental model of the 
expert where he has chosen to focus on the state  of the parent Y
1
11
sy=
1
1
sy
1
1 while Y2 is 
perceived in his judgement to be in a state compatible with this state of Y1, and (13) 
gives the distribution over X for all such compatible parental configurations. A similar 
interpretation goes for (14). Hence for any particular s  and , the expert would use 
(13) and (14) as reference points to come up with an assessment of (15).  
2s
 
In fact such a judgemental strategy would be an instance of the heuristic adjustment 
and anchoring. According to Kahneman and Tversky [18], “In many situations, 
people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield a final 
answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of 
the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation”. In our case (13) and 
(14), for some  and , are the two initial distributions. Using these as anchors the 
expert would adjust or interpolate (15), for the same  and , to lie somewhere in 
between these two distributions for compatible parental states. 
1s 2s
1s 2s
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Hence, the intuitive notion of interpolating a probability distribution in between two 
given distributions, or anchors, must first be rigorously spelt out. For this purpose, let 
us consider the set 7 of all probability distributions over the random variable X. 
Given two distributions  and  in 7, the intuitive notion that another distribution p 
is interpolated somewhere in between  and , would mean that p lies on the 
straight line joining  and ; this of course if 7 happened to be a flat space. For 7 
with more complicated geometry this would mean that p lies on the geodesic joining 
 and , for a geodesic encapsulates the notion of straightness. To generalise this 
concept, suppose we are given n distributions  in 7. How would we 
represent the intuitive notion of a probability distribution p being interpolated 
somewhere in between these given n distributions? Let us assume that 7 is endowed 
with a well behaved geometry such that there exists a unique geodesic connecting any 
two points in 7. Now recall that a subset * ⊆ 7 is said to be convex if any two 
arbitrary points in * can be joined by a geodesic segment contained in * [22]. Hence, 
the generalisation of the concept of a geodesic joining  and  is the concept of a 
convex hull spanned by the n points  in 7, therefore any interpolated 
distribution p would lie in such a convex hull.  
1p 2p
1p
p1
2p
p
np
1p 2p
1p 2p
np,,1 L
1p 2p
,,L
 
Let us now revert back to our original network with n parents as shown in Fig. 2. 
Given any , to estimate the probability distribution nss ,,1 L
( ) ( ) ( ){ }nnn snssmsnsssnss yyyxpyyyxpyyyxp ,,,|,,,,,|,,,,| 212121 21211210 LLLL ,                   (16) 
the expert would treat the n elicited distributions 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } )}({|,,)}({|,)}({| 10 jjj sjjmsjjsjj yYCompxpyYCompxpyYCompxp === L   
j = 1, µ, n,                                                                                                                 (17) 
for compatible parental configurations, as n anchor points and interpolate (16) to lie 
somewhere in between these points. Hence if our algorithm were to capture the 
expert’s judgmental strategy it should compute the distribution (16) to lie in the 
convex hull spanned by the n distributions in (17). Where exactly it should lie in the 
convex hull would be determined by the n weights . nwww ,,, 21 L
 
 
B. A Few Concepts from Information Geometry 
 
Convex sets and geodesics are geometric concepts, what we need therefore is a 
geometric appreciation of a set of probability distributions. The fact that such an 
appreciation can be obtained, or more specifically the fact that the methods of 
differential geometry can be fruitfully applied to gain insight into statistical structures 
was first realised in 1945 by Rao [23], who pointed out that the Fisher information 
determines a Riemannian metric on the set of probability distributions. Since then 
statisticians have enriched this insight [24]-[26] so much so that we now have a 
sophisticated way of viewing statistical structures in terms of geometry. Amari has 
coined the phrase information geometry to denote this happy confluence of ideas from 
geometry and statistics. In this section we compile a few information geometric tools 
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necessary for our analysis. In doing so we adhere closely to Amari’s treatment [27] of 
the subject. The reader may also wish to consult [28] for additional insight. The 
treatment of differential geometric concepts listed below is more in the nature of 
establishing notations than providing explanations. Adequate explanations can be 
readily perused in standard texts such as [29], [30].  
 
Consider a set ? having a finite number of elements. By probability distributions over 
? we mean functions such as p : ? →  such that p(x) ≥ 0 (∀x ∈ ?) and  
Let : be a set of these probability distributions chosen such that each element of : is 
parameterised by d real parameters; or we require the existence of a mapping φ 
: : → 
∑
∈
=
?x
xp 1)( .
}dθ ∞C
d which is one-to-one. Let us assume φ(:) to be an open subset in d and let 
, denote the ith coordinate function on dir di ,,1  ,: L=→ 
),,;( 1 dxp θθ L
},,{ 1 dθθ L
d, i.e. it acts on points 
in d to give their ith coordinate. If now we denote , then we can view φ as 
a global coordinate map on : with coordinate functions { . To convey this 
parameterisation explicitly we write the probability distributions in : in the 
form  or more compactly as p(x;θ) where we have substituted θ for 
. To carry out unhindered differentiations with respect to the parameters 
we assume that, for any x ∈ ?,  as a function of { is  in 
its domain of definition, which is φ(:). One can of course achieve the above 
parameterisation through various other mappings ψ : : → 
φθ oii r=
,1θ }, dθL
,1θ),,;( 1 dxp θθ L ,L
d. We consider all such 
mappings for which 1−φψ o  and are  - these will constitute a maximal 
atlas on : that includes φ thus making : a  d-dimensional manifold.  
1−ψφ o C
C
∞
∞∞C
 
To formulate the concepts of geodesics and convex sets, one requires the notion of 
parallel transport to be defined on :. This is done by defining an affine connection ∇. 
In general ∇ is an operator that maps any pair of C  vector fields U and V defined on 
: to a vector field ∇  on : while satisfying the properties of linearity and the 
Leibnitz rule [29], [30]. For later convenience we seek to explicate this concept with 
respect to the coordinate basis {  defined above. Given this coordinate basis 
we can define d vector fields ∂  on :, in the usual manner i.e. for any point q ∈ :, 
∞
∞C VU
},,1 dθθ L
i
q
ii q 
∂∂ θ:
∇∂


∂→ ∈ Tq(:) where Tq(:) is the tangent space at q. An affine connection ∇ 
on : is completely specified by specifying the d3 connection coefficients ::kijΓ
iθ ⊗
→ 
where i,j,k = 1, µ, d, and  are C  functions. The connection ∇ is then specified 
by the rule ; if in addition we have a metric , 
i,j = 1, µ, d, defined on :, we can use the metric to lower the upper index of the 
connection coefficients to give us . Note that we have invoked the 
summation convention where appropriate, i.e., indices appearing as subscripts and 
superscripts are summed over from 1 to d. 
k
ijΓ
k
k
ij ∂Γ
∞
kij =Γ ,
ji
=∂ jij ddgg θ=
hk
h
ij gΓ
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1) Amari's α-connections: Clearly the connection coefficients and hence a connection 
∇ can be assigned in an infinite variety of ways. Each such assignment assigns a 
geometry to : that is peculiar to that connection and each such geometry has its 
characteristic notions of geodesics and convex sets. We cannot have a definite notion 
of geodesics and convex sets unless we choose a definite connection to structure our 
manifold :. The question therefore is - are there any connections whose 
distinguishing properties make them undeniably suitable for our analysis? The answer 
is in the affirmative and the connections are a family of connections known as 
α-connections as defined by Amari. Amari and Nagaoka [27] write as follows - “a 
statistical model :, in addition to its structure as a manifold, has the property that each 
point denotes a probability distribution. Taking this property into consideration, we 
find that there are natural structural conditions which are uniquely met by (the Fisher 
metric and) the α-connections”. We sketch here, for quick reference, their arguments 
for preferring the α-connections; of course readers seeking more detailed reassurance 
should peruse them in the original. The reasoning runs as follows. In general 
information is lost when one summarises statistical data. However if the 
summarization takes place through sufficient statistic the information loss is nil. 
Therefore the concept of sufficient statistic plays an important role in statistical 
theories. The α-connections are uniquely characterised by the fact that they remain 
invariant when we pass from one statistical model to another through sufficient 
statistic. 
 
Let us proceed to define the α-connections. These are denoted by ∇ , and defined 
through their connection coefficients. With respect to the coordinate basis {  
these d
)(α
},,1 dθθ L
3 coefficients are given as: 
∑
∈ 





∂



∂∂−
+∂∂
=Γ
?x
k
ji
ji
kij xpxpxpxp
xp
);());(log());(log))(;(log(
2
1
);(log
)()(, θθθθα
θ
θα ;               (18) 
here α is an arbitrary real number, and i,j,k = 1, µ, d. 
 
The lowering of the index of the connection coefficients is achieved through the 
Fisher metric whose coefficients are given as follows: 
( )∑
∈
∂∂=
?x
jiij xpxpxpg );());(log))(;(log()( θθθθ , i,j, = 1, µ, d 
 
 
C The Weighted Sum Algorithm; A Geometric Point of View 
 
The weighted sum algorithm is concerned with probability distributions over the 
random variable X with m+1 states { . Hence we take 
? = { . Consider the set 7 of all probability distributions over ?. We 
define the global coordinate map φ : 7→ 
},,,, 210 mxxxx L
},,1 mθθ L
},,,, 210 mxxxx L
m in the following form. Given a 
distribution p ∈ 7, we assign coordinates {  to p as follows: 
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)()()( iii xpprp == φθ o

 ∈= },,{)( 1 mmθθφ L7



=−
≤≤
= ∑
=
(,1
1(   ,
);(
1
l
ml
xp m
i
i
l
l θ
θ
θ
; where , denotes the ith coordinate function on 

, →mir :
m
∀ ∑
=
 and ),( 
1
m
i
i θ
∞
m, i = 1, µ, m. 
j
h
i
m
h
hkij δδθ
αθα ∑
=
+−=Γ
1
2
)(
, )(2
1)(
)1(−

=F
In other words φ(7) is an open set in   given by  

<> 10| iiθ  
We can convey this coordinate system explicitly by writing the probability 
distributions as: 



)0
)
                  (19) 
One can now provide 7 with an C  atlas that includes φ thus making it an C  
m-dimensional manifold. This parameterisation φ is also called a mixture 
parameterisation [27].  
∞
 
From (18) the α-connection coefficients in the coordinate system { , can be 
calculated to give 
},,1 mθθ L
h
k
hδ ;                                                                                   (20) 
where the traditional Kronecker delta is defined as . 



≠
==
ji
jii
j   when0
  when1δ
 
For each different value of the parameter α, we get a different set of connection 
coefficients, each set imparting a characteristic geometry to 7. All we know is that the 
appropriate connections for statistical manifolds are α-connections. But which value 
of α should characterise the manifold under consideration is not known a-priori. 
Recall that the information that the expert is willing to give us are all contained in (7). 
These information are not sufficient to provide us with the specific nature of the 
connection coefficients on of the manifold 7. The prudent course in such 
circumstances is to opt for the simplest possible geometry that an α-connection can 
impart to 7. This is easily done; for α = -1, all the connection coefficients in (20) 
vanish imparting 7 with the simplest geometry, that of a flat manifold. We write ∇  
to denote this flat connection. 
)1(−
 
1) Flatness as a Mental Model: Our appeal to the simplest geometry resulted in 
assigning 7 with the flat connection ∇ . Yet as far as the human way of thinking is 
concerned the flatness of 7 is even more natural than that of choosing the simplest 
connection. Let us portray 7 as follows. Let   be the set of all real valued functions 
defined on ?, and consider the subset  ⊆ 
=∈ ∑
∈?
?
x
xff 1)(| ?. It can be 
shown that F is an affine subspace of ? [27, p 40]. As an affine space, F has a 
natural connection associated with it, which is a flat connection [28, pp 109-111]. 
?
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Hence the natural geometry on F is a flat geometry. Now the natural embedding of 7 
into ?
}
 maps 7 into an open subset of the affine space F – in fact it embeds it onto 
{ ?∈∀>∈ xxfFf   0)(|
)(0 and ,1)(
,,1  ,)(
1
1
qwqw
iqw
n
n
ii
q L
≤=
==
∑
∑
=
=
θθ
α
α
α
α
αα
,),(1 wqw nL
∑
=
=
n
ll xpqwxq
1
)()()(
α
αα
)}(,),({ 1 qwqw nL
. Hence as Amari points out, the  connection on 7 is 
nothing but the natural connection induced from the affine structure of F. When 
humans think of a probability distribution p over the set ? they think of it in terms of 
a set of (m + 1) real numbers p(x
)1(−∇
}, np
}mαθ
,,1qθ L
l), l = 0, 1, µ, m, which are the probability value 
associated with xl ∈ ?. In other words we think of 7 as it would appear if it were 
naturally embedded in ?. Hence the mental picture of 7 we have is naturally 
associated with the flat connection , and the linear structure of the weighted sum 
algorithm is a direct consequence of this mental picture. 
)1(−∇
,1 L=
 
2) Weighted Sums Generate Convex Sets: Let { , be n probability 
distributions in 7 where each  has coordinates { . Consider the subset 
* ⊆ 7 such that * consists of all points q with coordinates {  where  
,1p L
,,1αθ Lαp
}mqθ
.,  ,1
 with,
n
m
≤ α
                                                            (21) 
The n values {  are the relative weights that characterise the point q. 
Clearly any point q ∈ * defines a probability distribution over ? which can be given 
explicitly as the weighted sum  
)}(q
, l = 0,1 ,…, m.                                                                    (22) 
Hence different points in * are characterised by different sets of relative weights 
 and * consists of all probability distributions over ? which can be 
expressed as weighted sums in the form (22). We have the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: * ⊆ 7 is the convex hull of the set of distributions { .  },,1 npp L
In order not to interrupt our narrative we have banished the proof to Appendix A.  
 
In plain terms the proposition asserts that a probability distribution, which is 
computed as the weighted sum of a set of reference distributions, will lie in the 
convex hull generated by the reference set. A perusal of the proof in Appendix A 
would convince one that the position of the computed distribution in the convex hull 
is determined by the relative weights. Let us now hark back to Section III-A. The 
weighted sum algorithm (8) computes the distribution in (16) as a weighted sum of 
the n distributions in (17). Thus the computed distribution lies in the convex hull 
spanned by the n distributions in (17), the exact position being determined by the 
relative weights. Hence according to the arguments put forward in Section III-A the 
weighted sum algorithm does capture the expert's judgmental strategy. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
What makes the weighted sum algorithm attractive is the fact that it is at its essence a 
linear process. The linear structure, as we saw in the last section, is a necessary 
consequence of the way we think about a set of probability distributions. Occasionally 
one encounters points of view expressing general concern about linear models. As far 
as our efforts in this paper are concerned, such qualms are unfounded as a plethora of 
research in the process of decision making shows. In fact research shows that linear 
models often outperform experts [31]. As Dawes and Corrigan write [32] - "When 
there are actual criterion values against which the prediction of both the judge and the 
linear model of the judge can be compared, the (paramorphic) linear model often does 
a better job than does the judge himself. That is, the correlation between the output of 
the model and criterion is often higher than the correlation between the decision 
maker's judgement and criterion, even though the model is based on the behaviour of 
the decision maker". The success of linear models, according to these authors, arise 
from the fact that, whereas linear models distil the essence of a judge's expertise they 
avoid the otherwise unreliable part of the judge's reasoning process, the part that is 
affected by extraneous factors like boredom and fatigue. In fact this is precisely the 
reason why a CPT produced through the weighted sum algorithm would be more 
consistent than one produced manually by the expert. 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the weighted sum algorithm has been used to 
populate the CPTs of Bayesian networks dealing with problems related to military 
command and control [11]-[13]. For such problems the domain experts and the 
analysts are often the same. In other words an analyst would use his domain 
knowledge to generate the network and then use the network to make decisions. 
Needless to say that such analysts operate under constraints of limited time, and hence 
prefer a process that can be implemented within a sensible duration of time with 
manageable cognitive challenges. What is more the analyst needs to have confidence 
in the network he generates. This confidence would be lacking if the analyst were to 
populate the CPT, with its exponentially large number of distributions, manually. This 
is because of the difficulties in maintaining consistency among the distributions, 
across the CPT, as discussed in the introduction.  
 
The weighted sum algorithm ameliorates this predicament in two ways. Firstly the 
expert is required to come up with a vastly fewer number of probability distributions 
as input to the algorithm. It then becomes possible to maintain consistency, and be 
convinced about it. Furthermore as discussed in Section II-B, it is often possible to 
exploit the symmetries in a network to drastically reduce the number of distributions 
required as an input to the algorithm. When such reductions are possible the problem 
of maintaining consistency among the subjectively produced distributions becomes 
almost trivial. Secondly the concept of a weighted sum is familiar to almost all 
decision makers. Therefore the workings of the algorithm are intuitively transparent to 
the analyst and thus help promote further confidence in the generated network when 
used for decision making.  
 
Finally fine tuning a CPT generated through the weighted sum algorithm is rather 
straightforward. An analyst would do this so that the probability distributions 
computed, match closely up to his expectations. In most cases a slight tweak to the 
relative weights would suffice; in others an adjustment to the input probability 
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distributions may be necessary. Thus a CPT can be made to evolve with the analyst's 
subjective experiences. The Bayesian networks we have experience with, often form 
parts of some larger decision making process [33]. An ideal decision making process 
ought to be friendly towards the process of cognition [34], and the only way a 
decision making software can achieve friendliness is through a process of evolution. It 
is this prospect of acquiring a friendly software that makes the ability to easily fine 
tune a CPT so appealing. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove this proposition by showing that  
a). * is convex and 
b). * is contained in every convex set that contains the n distributions { . },,1 npp L
 
a): Let a and b be two points in * having coordinates {  and {  
respectively. From (21) it follows that these coordinates satisfy the relations: 
},,1 maa θθ L },,1 mbb θθ L
;,,1  ,1)(0 and ,1)(
 with,,,1  ,)(
1
1
nawaw
miaw
n
n
ii
a
L
L
=≤≤=
==
∑
∑
=
=
α
θθ
α
α
α
α
αα
                                                           (A1) 
and 
.,,1  ,1)(0 and ,1)(
 with,,,1  ,)(
1
1
nbwbw
mibw
n
n
ii
b
L
L
=≤≤=
==
∑
∑
=
=
α
θθ
α
α
α
α
αα
                                                           (A2) 
Here {  and {  are the relative weights that characterise the points a and 
b respectively.  
)}(awα )}(bwα
Let  : [0, 1] → 7 be the geodesic joining a with b, i.e., )(tiθ
i
a
i θθ =)0(  and , i = 1, µ, m.                                                                   (A3) ibi θθ =)1(
To prove that * is convex we have to show that the points { , 
all lie in *. Since we are working with the flat connection - all the coefficients 
 vanish - the geodesic equation reduces to [29], [30]: 
10  ,)}(,),(1 ≤≤ ttt mθθ L
)()1(, θ−Γ kij
0)(2
2
=
dt
td iθ                                                                                                                (A4) 
Taking into account the boundary conditions (A3) the solution to (A4) takes the form 
i
b
i
a
i ttt θθθ +−= )1()( , 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and i = 1, µ, m. 
Substituting from (A1) and (A2) we get 
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where  )()()1()( btwawttw ααα +−=
From (A1) and (A2) it follows that  
αα
α
α ∀≤≤=∑
=
 ,1)(0 and ,1)(
1
twtw
n
. 
Hence the points { , all lie in *, hence * is convex. 10 ,)}(,),(1 ≤≤ ttt mθθ L
 
b): Let + be a convex set that contains the n distributions { . Since + 
contains  and  it contains all the points on the geodesic joining with 
coordinates {  and  with coordinates { .  
},,1 npp L
1p 2p
, 1
mθ
1p
},11θ L 2p },, 212 mθθ L
Let  : [0. 1] → 7 be this geodesic. We have  )(tiθ
ii
1)0( θθ =  and , i = 1, µ, m.                                                                   (A5) ii 2)1( θθ =
Taking the boundary conditions (A5) into account, the solution to (A4) takes the form 
iii ttt 21)1()( θθθ +−= , 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and i = 1, µ, m. 
Hence a typical point on the geodesic joining  and  has coordinates , 
i = 1, µ, m, for some  and , for which 
1p
1
2p
12
ii ww 2211 θθ +
1≤1w 2w  ,0 and 21≤=+ wwww . All such 
points are contained in +.  
 
We intend to invoke induction. Suppose that for some r < n, + contains all the points 
of the form  
∑
=
r
iw
1α
ααθ , i = 1, µ, m, for some 0 1,,1 ≤≤ rww L , for which                 (A6) ∑
=
=
r
w
1
1
α
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The above points are associated with the distributions , since + also contains 
the distribution  it follows that it contains all the points on the geodesic joining 
any point of the type (A6) to the point { . The geodesic equation (A4) 
with such boundary conditions gives the solution  
rpp ,,1 L
}1
1+rp
,,1 1
m
rr ++ θθ L
i
r
r
ii twtt 1
1
)1()( +
=
+−= ∑ θθθ
α
αα , 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and i = 1, µ, m. 
Hence a typical point on this geodesic has coordinates , i = 1, µ, m, for 
some weights 0
∑+
=
1
1
r
iw
α
ααθ
1, 11 ≤≤ +rww L , for which ∑  and all such points are 
contained in +. Invoking induction we conclude that + contains all the points of the 
type  
+
=
=
1
1
1
r
w
α
α
 21
∑
=
n
iw
1α
ααθ , i = 1, µ, m, for some 1,0 1 ≤≤ nww L , for which . Now referring 
back to (21) we see that + ⊇ *. This combined with the fact that * is convex proves 
Proposition 1. 
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